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REFLECTIVE PRACTICE

Tactics in Philanthropy:
The Case of the Moving Spotlight
Dan M. Martin, Ph.D., Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Keywords: Tactical philanthropy, grantmaking style, foundation evaluation

Key Points
· In recent years, strategy has been a muchdiscussed topic in philanthropy, while tactics have
received little attention.
· The experience of the MacArthur Foundation’s
environmental program and its Moving Spotlight
approach provide examples of the importance of
tactical decisions.
· Tactical decisions such as the timing of grants,
foundation staffing levels, and the timing of evaluations all contribute to grantees’ ability to achieve
outcomes.
· Structure and flexibility can be complementary
approaches to grantmaking if the tactics are well
thought out.

Strategy has become a buzzword in the large and
growing literature that offers advice to philanthropists and managers of private foundations.
Despite the variety of voices, the message is uniform: To be effective, philanthropy must become
strategic. Implicit in this advice is the contention that private foundations in general have not
been particularly effective because they have not
been sufficiently strategic. This position presents
significant problems because, at a minimum, the
meaning of strategy is poorly articulated1 and
alleged donor failures are almost never described
in any detail.
1
See Prosico, T. (2000). In other words: A plea for plain
speaking by foundations, pp. 19-21, (New York: Edna McConnell Clark Foundation), for an pointed but amusing
critique of the overuse and misuse of the word. Every
advocate of “strategic philanthropy” should read it.
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An old concept in warfare and international politics, the notion of strategy has been adopted (and
adapted) by management professors for use in
their classes, books, and consulting trade. In the
process they have reduced the clarity of the word.
Applications of the term more recently to philanthropy have muddied its meaning even further.
In military and diplomatic parlance, a key distinction exists between strategy and tactics, and that
distinction contributes to the definition of both
terms. The difference between them is not obscure, but it has become vague or even immaterial
in much of the current literature about private
giving. The tactical aspects of philanthropy rarely
receive serious attention, and the distinction has
largely been lost in the vigorous, but sometimes
misconceived, discussion in books, articles,
and blogs about what philanthropy needs.2 This
pattern of thought seems to imply that strategy
describes everything a foundation must do to
improve its performance or that the tactical elements of philanthropy are so obvious to all that
they raise no substantial questions.
A traditional definition of these concepts is that
strategy consists of one’s goals and that tactics are
about methods or techniques for achieving those
goals. In other words, strategy is substantive and
2
For example, in Frumkin, P. (2006). The essence of strategic
giving (Chicago: University of Chicago), a thoughtful examination of challenges in philanthropy, the author advocates
order and discipline but treats several tactical dimensions
as basic elements of “strategic giving” (pp. 61-68, 77-103).
Paul Brest, in “A Decade of Outcome-Oriented Philanthropy,” Stanford Social Innovation Review (Spring 2012),
further demonstrates the ambiguity of the concept.
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tactics are procedural.3 From that position, it follows that both strategy and tactics must be closely
considered to achieve major philanthropic objectives. A substantial imbalance in thinking about
both of these basic dimensions can result in lower
returns on donors’ investments. The purpose of
this article is to suggest ways of diminishing that
risk in the management of private foundations
through a closer examination of the range of options in grantmaking tactics.
In philanthropy, tactics are about choices of style
and method in making grants or loans. They are
not about a donor’s objectives – which do need
to be sharply defined to avoid scattering scarce
resources. Assuming that any such objectives are
inherently strategic, however, weakens the case
for “strategic philanthropy.” How do we recognize
genuinely strategic strategies? Clear strategy is
truly essential, and being truly strategic requires
more careful thought (and information) than
merely announcing one’s goals. An objective standard for being strategic in private philanthropy is
needed, but identifying appropriate elements for
such a standard is a topic for a separate analysis.
A pervasive problem with claims that foundations
have failed to be sufficiently strategic is that many
of these critics call for rigorous data-driven choices and evidence-based evaluation of grantees,
while they rarely apply such tests to the design
or coherence of donors’ programs. Such analyses
present little specific evidence to support assertions about the present or past shortcomings of
private philanthropy or the need for new modes
of operation. Claims about the broad inadequacy
of foundations in general are simply posited and
seldom questioned. Where are the data supporting this view of American philanthropic history
and the closely related advice widely offered to
donors? 4

3
Although these terms can be subdivided, the fundamental
distinction remains significant. See the introductory article
in Kennedy, P. (Ed.), (1991). Grand strategy in war and
peace, pp. 1-7. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
4
Susan Berresford, former president of the Ford Foundation, explored such questions in “What’s the Problem With
Strategic Philanthropy?” in the Chronicle of Philanthropy
(October 2010), p. 33.
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More attention to the history of private foundation actions could add useful perspective to
current discussions about philanthropic effectiveness. Matching the global influence exercised
over many years by the Rockefeller Foundation,
for example, would be difficult. The steep increase
in the number of American foundations and their
financial resources during the last 25 or 30 years
neither diminishes the results of earlier philanthropic efforts nor justifies clams that we live in a
new “golden age” of philanthropy. Unfortunately,
more is not necessarily better.

In philanthropy, tactics are about
choices of style and method in
making grants or loans. They are not
about a donor’s objectives – which
do need to be sharply defined to
avoid scattering scarce resources.
Assuming that any such objectives
are inherently strategic, however,
weakens the case for “strategic
philanthropy.” How do we recognize
genuinely strategic strategies?
At the very least, some balance is needed in the
consideration of foundation effectiveness and
the role of strategy (however the term is defined)
in achieving significant results. Because tactical
choices are widely overlooked, taken for granted,
or conflated with strategy, increased analysis of
tactical options – and of history – would be useful additions to the discourse about designing and
managing grantmaking programs and elevating
the influence of private philanthropic actions. 5

5
Stannard-Stockton (2007) separates tactics from strategy,
but focuses on varied legal instruments rather than on
methods for making grants.
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To illustrate the large role that tactics can have in
a foundation’s work, the specific experience of the
MacArthur Foundation’s environment program,
which the author directed for its first 15 years,
might provide some relevant examples. The following report describes the somewhat unusual
tactical approaches taken by that program, but it
is not meant to offer a model that other foundations should adopt. Its point is that the range
of available tactics is broader than is commonly
recognized in the design of foundation programs,
and its aim is to encourage more tactical experimentation.

The most unusual choice was
presenting grant recommendations
to the foundation’s board of
directors in integrated portfolios
for each of the program’s geographic
focal areas and thematic categories
simultaneously and almost entirely
at recurring three-year intervals.
We called this tactical pattern “the
Moving Spotlight.”

Background: Strategic Choices Set the
Stage
Beginning in 1986, the MacArthur environment
program explored both strategic and tactical
options for its grantmaking and adopted some
unconventional practices. Probably the most
unusual choice was presenting grant recommendations to the foundation’s board of directors in
integrated portfolios for each of the program’s
geographic focal areas and thematic categories
simultaneously and almost entirely at recurring
three-year intervals. We called this tactical pattern “the Moving Spotlight.”
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The program’s geographic targets were the biodiversity hotspots, first described by the British
ecologist Norman Myers (1988). Myers’ analysis
gave MacArthur an objective, data-driven way
to focus its program rather than relying on the
unexplained preferences of board or staff members, which often shape foundation strategies.
The hotspots were relevant as a way of organizing
a global nature conservation program because
more than 50 percent of known terrestrial species
of plants and animals occur in those areas that
cover less than two percent of the Earth’s land
surface. They were further defined by estimates of
endemism and degree of threat or destruction –
all coarse but quantifiable and open criteria. Concentrated locations and countability made species
diversity an explainable choice. Those tight foci
allowed us to function globally in a plausible way
with a small staff and a relatively small budget
(never more than $20 million per year).
Taking other strategic decisions, we concentrated
even more narrowly on the tropical hotspots,
situated in low-income regions that possessed
little local conservation capacity, and omitting
those in temperate and Mediterranean zones, located mostly in more affluent countries. In other
words, we chose our geographic targets through
the application of objective and relevant screens,
which we could, and did, explain publicly.
Later, we expanded our strategic focal points to
include the most species-diverse marine areas,
mostly in the southwestern Pacific. With a category of thematic grants, the program also attempted
to advance environmental law, conservation science, training for natural resource managers, and
sustainable economic development but only as
actions in those fields affected the sharply defined
regions in which we worked.
This report aims to describe both our use of the
“spotlight” approach in those contexts and the
strong connections between the strategic choices
and tactical methods employed in the concrete
case of the MacArthur program. They shaped
each other. Tactics are mundane considerations
compared to grand strategy, and process concerns
are often viewed as the preoccupations of overly
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bureaucratic organizations, but they are inherently consequential for private foundations in
pursuing their goals.
Each of the following sections explores an apparently routine aspect of administrative processes
common to nearly all private foundation programs. All of them can be managed in a variety of
ways – more ways than are routinely considered.
Deciding how much staff is required to carry out
a grantmaking program properly, for example, is
rarely discussed by observers of private foundation practice. Neither that decision nor the timing
for awarding grants commands much thought by
those observers, but they can be significant design
elements, as shown by the MacArthur program’s
experience.

Staffing and Timing: How Do Bureaucratic
Size and Rhythm Affect Results?
We adopted the "spotlight" pattern largely so
we could operate globally with a very small staff
(three program officers, each responsible for a
continental region), thereby minimizing administrative costs and maximizing the funds available
for awarding grants. Starting in Latin America,
we expanded into nine geographic target zones,
three per continent in three-year cycles, giving
each program officer the task of preparing one
set of grants per year in one region, presented for
board approval all at the same time.
That steady rhythm put a visible emphasis (or
spotlight) on our development of custom-tailored
strategies for each hotspot. These diverse plans
were expressed through portfolios of grants
meant to produce converging and mutually reinforcing effects. Seeking synergy among grantees
is not a rare practice, but awarding all grants for a
major category simultaneously for three-year periods was (and still is) eccentric. While following
this pattern, we could also describe the options
we had decided not to pursue – and why – rather
than just listing our preferences and calling them
strategies.
As a result of this process, program officers could
plan their investigations of regional conditions
and applicants’ capabilities around the dates,
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published far in advance, when they would make
their single annual presentations to the Foundation’s board. These presentations provided the
reasoning (or theories of change) for proposed
clusters of actions, information about individual
grantees, and how their effects were expected to
converge. This process took seriously the concept
of portfolio effects in grantmaking.

Tactics are mundane considerations
compared to grand strategy, and
process concerns are often viewed
as the preoccupations of overly
bureaucratic organizations, but
they are inherently consequential
for private foundations in pursuing
their goals. Deciding how much
staff is required to carry out a
grantmaking program properly,
for example, is rarely discussed by
observers of private foundation
practice.

By considering staff recommendations in these
clusters, the board of directors and the Foundation’s managers could more easily see, question,
and understand what the program staff sought to
accomplish in each portfolio. We also were able
to explain our actions to grant seekers working
in our target regions, displaying our consistency
and reducing their need to guess about the
Foundation’s intentions. That scrutiny pressed
our program officers to produce relatively welldefined and justified plans for each hotspot at
three-year intervals as we applied our common
procedural approach to deeply varied situations
in many tropical countries. In other words, our
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TABLE 1 The Moving Spotlight

Year

AFRICA

ASIA-PACIFIC

LATIN AMERICACARIBBEAN

2001

Lower Guinean Forest

Melanesia

Insular Caribbean

2002

Madagascar

Indo-Burma

Southern Andes

2003

Albertine Rift

Sundaland

Northern Andes

2004

Lower Guinean Forest

Melanesia

Insular Caribbean

2005

Madagascar

Indo-Burma

Southern Andes

2006

Albertine Rift

Sundaland

Northern Andes

tactical process, used in every place, influenced
our substantive strategies, which were unique in
each place. (Table 1 illustrates how the Moving
Spotlight moved, as projected in 2000.)

take calculated risks while seeking influence that
exceeds their financial capacity. That universal
condition makes highly risk-averse behavior by
any foundation, at the very least, unfortunate.

While keeping the program staff small was
initially motivated by the desire to minimize administrative costs, maintaining a lean staff, based
entirely in Chicago, also offered the advantage that
we were less able to concern ourselves with the
detailed management of the work supported by
our grants. A large staff with a substantial number
of industrial country experts can (and inevitably
does) intrude on the conduct of grant-supported
work. They inexorably provide detailed guidance,
require extensive reporting, and reduce the time
grantees have for implementing their programs.
Such supervision can constrain grantees’ creativity, limit their resilience when conditions change,
and reduce their prospects for long-term success.6
In that way, too many foundations and major
donors work against their own goals.

Operating with a small staff also necessarily
reduced the number of grants we could sensibly
award and limited our use of small, highly specific,
and labor-intensive actions. This condition reflects
the very low correlation that exists between the
size of foundation grants and the amount of staff
time required to process them diligently. Small
grants, carefully awarded, often take as much staff
time as substantially larger grants. In many cases
small grants are useful, but the cost implications
of using them extensively (a tactical choice) are
inescapable. They can also lead to scattering one’s
resources, a pervasive risk and common shortcoming in private philanthropy.

One of the great advantages possessed by private
foundations is that they need not burden themselves or their clients with the ponderous bureaucratic procedures required by most government
agencies. For that reason, it is particularly ironic
when some (mostly larger) foundations adopt
procedures and operating styles similar to those
commonly employed by public sector donors.
Private foundations are uniquely positioned to

Because of the power dynamic between donors
and grantees, the detailed oversight possible for
a large staff frequently reduces the usefulness of
grants intended to strengthen recipient institutions. As we learned from experience, even gentle
suggestions from program officers are routinely
seized upon by grant seekers whether they are
good ideas or not. Believing the inevitable flattery that comes with their jobs is a pleasant but
genuine mental health hazard for foundation staff
members – with fairly frequent negative effects
(Menninger, 1981).

6
Andrew Natsios, a former Administrator of the US
Agency for International Development, describes at length
the negative effects of “Obsessive Measurement Disorder”
in The Clash of the Counter-bureaucracy and Development
(Center for Global Development, 2010).

Because the Moving Spotlight relied on clusters of
explicitly interdependent grants rather than more
conventional lists of probably meritorious projects
that might (or might not) be strongly related to
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each other, we believed that it increased our prospects of achieving meaningful (i.e., long-term)
influence. We told ourselves that the collective
effect of these clusters should be more substantial
and durable than separate actions awarded serially. Assessing the validity of such an assumption,
however, is best done by others – and seeking
such judgments was an integral part of our standard tactical practice.

Monitoring and Evaluation: Does Nothing
Happen Unless It’s Measured?
Portfolios of grants, presented as tightly woven
packages, also served to strengthen the systematic evaluation of the program’s work. Because
of this method of grantmaking, our evaluation process could consider the effects of entire
clusters in addition to assessing the results of
individual awards. The metaphor we used was
that our grants should form tapestries of action
rather than loose strands of yarn. The question
was whether our weaving produced coherent and
relevant patterns or results.
Within the three-year recurring cycles, evaluation
could be conducted on a routine basis, becoming prospective as well as retrospective. To start,
considering varied proposals in defined areas at
the same time allows direct comparisons among
them – a logical advantage not available when
grants are awarded in the standard manner, seriatim and at random intervals. This is an extremely
simple point that is not widely recognized in the
processes used by foundations with professional
staffing.
Program officers and our grants administrator
reviewed grantees’ annual reports and reported
major developments at routine meetings of the
program team. Our receipt of annual reports triggered the release of annual payments as scheduled, unless a major problem arose. Intervention
by foundation staff while a grant was active,
however, was rare. We tried to monitor grantsupported actions without presuming to direct
them.
The distinction between conscientious monitoring and attempting to manage grantees is fundamental, but is sometimes missed by foundation
THE
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officials. Consistent monitoring is an essential element of ongoing evaluation, but it becomes difficult to evaluate grantees’ performance objectively
when they are being managed in some detail by
donor-agency staff. Maintaining an appropriate distance from grantees enhances meaningful
evaluation and allows more staff learning from
their grantmaking experience. Because MacArthur had chosen ambitious objectives, we did not
view small scale or short-term measurements (or
“metrics”) as sources of relevant learning from
our work.

A central element of this process
was asking for evaluations of our
staff’s portfolio designs as well
as reports on the performance of
our grantees, thereby gauging our
contributions as well as theirs.
We asked: Did the effects of our
grants cohere or converge in ways
that we anticipated? Did we
adequately understand the concrete
circumstances of our grantees in
quite varied regions?
When the end of the standard three-year time
spans of our portfolios approached, the foundation’s evaluation director hired two external consultants (normally one American with relevant
expertise and one practitioner from the region in
question) to meet independently with grantees,
examine emerging results, and compare them
with the original theories of change presented
by program staff when the grants were awarded.
Their reports were given to the board of directors, often in person, and their comments directly
influenced staff plans for subsequent clusters of
grants.
95
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A central element of this process was asking for
evaluations of our staff ’s portfolio designs as well
as reports on the performance of our grantees,
thereby gauging our contributions as well as
theirs. We asked: Did the effects of our grants
cohere or converge in ways that we anticipated?
Did we adequately understand the concrete
circumstances of our grantees in quite varied
regions? Did we achieve any meaningful leverage
or influence with the behavior of other major actors: local communities, states, multilateral banks,
foreign aid agencies, or business firms? Did our
grants, in other words, support or precipitate
more progress toward our strategic goals than we
could directly buy with the foundation’s money?
The answers, of course, were varied.

Transparency and discipline can
simplify proposal review processes,
constrain administrative expenses,
build trusting relationships,
improve staff knowledge, and reduce
the sense that dealing with a private
foundation is like buying lottery
tickets.
Transparency and Efficiency: Reducing
Costs by Opening the Windows
The Moving Spotlight also contributed to the program’s efficiency by reducing the number of proposals that received close attention from our staff.
By announcing the sequence of regions where we
would make grants each year and closing dates
for submitting proposals in them, we regulated
the volume and structured the flow of incoming
requests. We hoped that doing so elevated the
quality of our discussions with grant seekers (our
customers).
Because the movements of the “spotlight” were
steady and predictable, those customers could
plan ahead on presenting requests at appropriate
96

times. Similarly, our relatively crisp, published
guidelines helped them to avoid wasting their
time with proposals that didn’t come close to
fitting our program or its timing. By requesting
simple, two-page letters of inquiry as the first step
for each applicant, we could assess their potential
fit and respond quickly, inviting full proposals
from a fairly small number of them and explaining to the others why we chose not to pursue their
requests.
This procedure was designed to manage the flow
of proposals without denying ourselves useful information. Managing that flow is entirely
necessary, but we concluded that reading only
proposals invited by our staff (a very common
foundation practice) was seriously unwise – we
could too easily miss valuable possibilities. Our
goal was to process fully only about two proposals for every grant awarded, thus minimizing the
transactions costs to grant seekers of dealing with
us. That ratio made our small staff adequate to
doing a thorough job of reviewing proposals that
appeared to be promising, devising integrated
portfolios of new grants, and monitoring actions
supported by existing grants in their regions.
We published newsletters after each meeting of
the MacArthur board, describing the clusters of
grants awarded to inform grant seekers about
the foundation’s thinking as well as announcing its actions. In these newsletters, we tried to
explain the reasons for our new grants, more than
simply listing them and their purposes. Publishing the reasoning behind our choices was also
intended to express respect for all our customers
and to demonstrate how we adhered to our own
guidelines, attempting to treat applicants fairly
and consistently, seeking to work with them as
trusted partners. Transparency and discipline
can simplify proposal review processes, constrain
administrative expenses, build trusting relationships, improve staff knowledge, and reduce the
sense that dealing with a private foundation is like
buying lottery tickets.

Collective Learning Portfolios: Who Does
the Learning?
The program also organized meetings of all grantees and other relevant informants in each area
THE

FoundationReview 2012 Vol 4:3

Tactics in Philanthropy

shortly before the end of the three-year cycles
to discuss grant-supported work and evolving
regional situations in natural resources management. These events were designed to stimulate
participants’ learning from one another, give us
feedback on our existing grants, and help us in
designing subsequent clusters of actions. We
conducted them in the regions under review, with
travel costs paid by the Foundation.
Grantees in developing countries rarely have
useful opportunities for interaction, particularly
when the problems they deal with are not constrained by political frontiers, as is often the case.
Ecosystems, rather than states, were our foci, and
we wanted to build relevant networks among actors in the field.7 These events were equally useful
for reviewing our clusters of thematic grants in
the emergent fields of environmental law, sustainable forestry, and locally managed fisheries. They
were generally successful in building personal
connections among frontline actors, improving
staff understanding of changing conditions on the
ground, deepening our knowledge of grantees’
local reputations, and shaping our subsequent
decisions about new and renewal grants.
We assumed that the foundation would maintain
its effort in each region or theme for at least three
three-year cycles. In this way, we tried to be a
reliable source of funding rather than an unpredictable donor. At the same time, in response
to grantees’ performance, changing regional
circumstances, and what we learned in these
meetings, we routinely adjusted the mix of our
grants in each hotspot. Doing so only at threeyear intervals (rather than attempting to adjust
continuously) allowed us to focus on significant
changes that might not be understood as well at
shorter intervals, and it led us to be deliberate and
explicit about such shifts.

7
The largely automatic use of political maps as the organizing structure of most international donor programs is a
major strategic error when dealing with natural phenomena (like ecosystems) or with the many cultural patterns
that do not conform to state boundaries that were imposed
by European powers without regard to significant local
circumstances. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East
are prime examples, but the problem of treating states as if
they were somehow natural entities is widespread.
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That habit, in turn, made it easy for us to explain such actions to the foundation’s public.
We described this practice as being similar to
stop-action photography, which improves the
viewer’s perception of change as the camera’s
shutter captures movement over time by opening
and closing intermittently. The implicit contrast
in this metaphor with the blurry pictures that
result from time exposures was deliberate, and we
worked to share what we learned this way with
actors in each region or thematic category.
We aimed to conduct more thorough evaluations about conditions in each region or theme at
nine-year intervals to decide whether to continue
or shift our focus. The foundation made several

Another unusual practice was our
consistent use of fixed, front-loaded,
and declining payment schedules,
unrelated to the timing of expected
expenditures by grantees. This
meant that we paid most grantees a
larger amount in the first year of a
normal three-year award than they
were likely to spend that year.
widely announced changes in the definition of its
geographic targets, based on our experience, new
data, and advice from panels of experts. Decisions
to terminate or alter the program’s focal areas
(strategic choices) included exit plans (a tactical
choice) that allowed us to withdraw in a transparent and tapered fashion. In these ways, we
tried to advance collective learning and minimize
potential damage to organizations that we had
supported when we geared up in new areas.

Payment Schedules: Eccentricity With a
Purpose
Another unusual practice was our consistent use
of fixed, front-loaded, and declining payment
97
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the declining payout schedules in each three-year
cycle reduced the damage that could result when
we decided not to include particular grantees
in subsequent portfolios. Sudden changes in
soft-money revenue present a perennial problem for nonprofit organizations, and the loss of
overhead revenue when a major grant ends can be
disruptive to an exaggerated degree. Our tactical
approach was an attempt to limit that unintended
effect, which is simply intrinsic to the project
mode of grantmaking. Repeated flat annual payThe intent of that eccentric practice was to avoid
ments, in particular, can create the expectation of
overly refined and inflexible budgets and to
continued support – until the donor decides to
underscore the need for grantees to seek other
donors to make their programs sustainable. It cre- drop out. Too many nonprofit grantees have reated recurring benefits in budgeting and cash flow lied on recurring one-year grants from long-term
supporters, only to be injured, sometimes badly,
management for grantees and for the Foundawhen the apparently faithful source of revenue
tion. Recipients of these grants knew when they
evaporates.
would receive our payments, and they did not
have to wait for reimbursement after spending
The reasoning behind our unconventional payother scarce funds. This tactical policy made the
Foundation’s budgeting easier because we avoided ment schedules was that the long-term operathe uncertain timing of payout amounts and pre- tion of any substantial effort is bound to require
multiple donors, and we believed that aiming for
served our budget flexibility in future years.
the long term is necessary for achieving major
philanthropic goals. Private foundations are able,
Grantees were neither held to spending grant
if they wish, to make more stable commitments
funds on fixed schedules nor required to return
than most government agencies, which can shift
funds not spent at the end of the formal term
suddenly because of elections, political instability,
of their grants. They were also allowed to keep
or the whims of authoritarian rulers. Yet solitary
any interest they might earn on payments made
long-term support of a grantee can lead to a form
before they spent our grant funds. We did not
of ownership, as if the donor were an operating
want tight budgeting to limit grantees’ responses
to unexpected events (which alone are inevitable), foundation, making objective evaluation difficult.
and we wanted to escape any implication that our If we alone could understand the value of a particular program after a reasonable demonstration
grants were like commercial purchase orders.
period, a plausible assessment might be that our
initial judgment had been defective.
The program also awarded grants with round
number totals (such as $750,000 over three
years) in contrast to the conventional practice of
Assembling Diverse Portfolios: Seeking
granting precise amounts and time frames (such
Leverage With Unlikely Bedfellows
as $746,212 over 19 months), which suggest that
The Moving Spotlight procedure incorporated the
the cost and timing of influential actions can be
understanding that attempting to advance largeprojected to the last penny or scheduled to occur scale social change of any kind is an extraordiat predetermined moments. These practices renarily challenging task and that such objectives
flected our confidence in our grantees’ judgment
call for complex, flexible, and custom-tailored
about when they could most usefully spend grant responses. We sought diverse and unconventional
funds and our appreciation of the uncertainties of combinations of grantees and actions in connonprofit management and of money’s fungibility. structing the Foundations's responses. (See Figure
1.) This approach also expressed our tactical comIn many cases, we renewed grants that seemed to mitment to enveloping our targets from varied
work well for additional three-year periods, but
angles rather than using frontal attacks along a
schedules, unrelated to the timing of expected
expenditures by grantees. This meant that we paid
most grantees a larger amount in the first year of
a normal three-year award than they were likely
to spend that year. Then our schedules provided
two smaller step-down payments in years two and
three. For example, a grant for $600,000 might
be paid out in annual installments of $250,000,
$200,000, and $150,000.
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FIGURE 1 Diversity of actions and actors can enhance results.

Program Tactics: Diversity of Actions

Effective conservation requires a mixture of actions
Scientific Research
Formal Education
(Professional & General)

Government Regulation &
Legal Processes

Informal Public Education

Biodiversity
Conservation

Direct Conservation
Projects (protected
areas, advocacy)

Market Signals

Policy Research

Program Tactics: Diversity of Actors

Effective conservation requires a mixture of actors
Scientific Institutions
(zoos, botanic gardens,
museums)
Mass Media (publishers &
broadcasters)

Universities & Schools

Government Agencies

Biodiversity
Conservation

Grassroots
Organizations

Business
Corporations

Think Tanks
Conservation Development NGOs
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real world, even in laboratories, where variables
can be minimized. Consequently, we assumed
that treating a highly complex, nonlinear field
The point of the figure is that in each focal area
such as nature conservation and sustainable ecothe program staff considered a full range of options, as we saw them, among potential actors and nomic development as if it were an engineering
actions. Then we attempted to find a unique mix- problem would express an unrealistic and selfdefeating perspective. That situation is common
ture of them that seemed likely to advance conwhen private foundations adopt ambitious strateservation in that particular place. The strategies
gies rather than more easily reached goals.
that guided the design of each cluster of grants
were products of this process, and they often included unorthodox (or even unlikely) teammates. High-quality engineering is essential in construcAlthough improved biodiversity conservation was tion projects, mechanical or electronic design,
the strategic target for the MacArthur program, a and manufacturing processes, in each of which
similar figure could usefully be constructed to de- most conditions can be managed. That level of
control, however, is not available for attempts to
scribe the potential array of grantees and actions
stimulate and sustain major changes in economic,
available in any field of philanthropy.
political, or social systems. Based on those views,
making mostly program grants as opposed to
However gratifying they may sound, simple,
elegant solutions for large-scale human problems project grants and allowing substantial flexibility
in spending these grants became a central feature
inevitably fall short of their intended results. The
of the Moving Spotlight style. We rejected the
diversity of our world (and of our species) is too
standard and rarely questioned assumption that
great to force into linear global plans, as demonstrated by the failure of many highly sophisticated projects designed in detail offer the obvious, fundamental mode for grantmaking.
economic development projects guided by the
“best” international experts. We assumed that in
essentially every place, local is a synonym for real, The Golden Mean: Can Program Grants
and that social change will always be unpredictServe Strategic Objectives?
able and chaotic.
Program grants occupy a middle position
between unrestricted institutional support and
Similarly, we took it as a basic principle that
highly defined project grants. For large (mostly
achieving social change depends much more on
U.S.-based) conservation organizations, program
the sustained efforts of deeply rooted creative
grants allowed us to help them launch operations
leaders and resilient, persistent institutions than it in new areas or to strengthen specific parts of
does on the short-term, highly defined, and read- their already extensive agendas. With small nonily measured projects required by many donors,
profit groups, mostly based in our target regions,
both public and private. Our operating stance was program grants often covered much of what they
that creative and effective leadership can rarely be were attempting to do, helping them to build new
expressed through remotely designed schemes,
visibility, confidence, competence, and influence.
experiments interesting for distant observers, or
restricted budgets imposed by varied donors. This Except for supporting relevant conferences and
point of view is hardly unconventional, but it has
similar events, we also minimized the use of onenot been widely adopted by foundations or by
year grants on the premise that little truly influprominent sources of philanthropic advice.
ential action can occur in such short time frames.
Often justified as a method for maintaining tight
Following logically from that position was our
reins on grantees, annual grants can be expensive
view that the responses of influential leaders and
in staff effort for both donors and recipients. In
institutions to changing conditions can be no
that way, they generally reduce returns on philanmore determined in advance than the progress of thropic investments.
basic scientific research. Surprises abound in the
single axis, a style favored by some donors.
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A constant objective of the MacArthur program
was the durable influence of grantees, ideally
well beyond the term of our financial support. In
effect, the goal was to help appropriate grantee
organizations or programs to become institutions,
implying long and influential lives for them. Resilient (and therefore durable) institutions are the
indispensable instruments through which creative
leadership is most effectively implemented and
ambitious foundation goals can most reliably be
advanced.

A constant objective of the
MacArthur program was the
durable influence of grantees,
ideally well beyond the term of our
financial support. In effect, the goal
was to help appropriate grantee
organizations or programs to

Thus the basic challenge was deciding how we
could strengthen relevant organizations and
become institutions, implying long
expand the supply of individual leaders working in
and influential lives for them.
our target zones. To do that, we emphasized broad
program grants for promising local organizations, funding for partnerships between them and
industrial country institutions committed to their
growth, and support of education and research
other relevant actors, including those whose proopportunities for people living and working in the posals we rejected. Without such an atmosphere,
tropical biodiversity hotspots.
no foundation will find it possible to achieve candid dialogue with its customers. Seeking honest
Predicting specific outcomes by certain dates as
exchanges between donors and grant seekers who
results of such grants would have been entirely
are treated as partners rather than incompetent
unrealistic or would have led us to be satisfied
suspects can be a source of both efficiency and
with small, uncomplicated, and possibly trivial
impact.
objectives. Program grants are about altering the
circumstances in which any foundation’s strategic Because the MacArthur program’s selection of its
objectives occur. Through using them, we aimed
target regions was derived from three explicit, dato improve the prospects for our relative success
ta-based criteria rather than unexplained preferin making progress toward our goals.
ences or unpredictably changing donor “interests,”
we had the unusual advantage of operating with
A noteworthy and consequential result of awardfalsifiable strategic priorities. When a grant seeker
ing broad program grants is that recipients almost questioned our geographic choices, we could say
always spend relatively flexible funds with exquithat we would change them if our policy-shaping
site care. Nonprofit managers are strongly motidata were incorrect. Taking this position helped
vated to use such money exactly when and where
us to maintain respectful relationships with our
it will make the greatest difference to their success customers.
– as they are best qualified to judge. Funds from
closely restricted grant budgets are normally spent We also acted on the belief that demands by
whether they are really needed or not. Giving
donors for highly detailed budgets, schedules, and
grantees flexibility can in most cases lead to better frequent ”milestones” mostly display their misunresults than maintaining tight control.
derstanding of the challenges faced by nonprofit
managers. Donor impact is clearly advanced by
Trust and Respect: What’s the True Story? learning as much as possible from grant seekers,
understanding their problems and how they funcA critical objective of the Moving Spotlight was
tion. Foundation officers can too easily preach to
to engender an atmosphere of mutual trust and
applicants for grants, learning little in the process.
respect among the foundation, its grantees, and
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Another large factor shaping our tactics was the
foundation’s strategic decision to work globally,
meaning that we were a foreign agency in most of
the places where we made grants. Being foreign
(and American) meant that we needed to function
in a low-key manner to escape suspicions that we
had hidden agendas or sought domination. Not
maintaining conspicuous field offices staffed with
U.S. experts helped us in that respect.

We also acted on the belief that
demands by donors for highly
detailed budgets, schedules, and
frequent ”milestones” mostly
display their misunderstanding of
the challenges faced by nonprofit
managers.

We also recruited program officers who were experienced conservationists and natives of our focal areas to give us meaningful intelligence about
subtle cultural and political factors, local perspectives about grant seekers, and practical operating
experience in those regions. They improved our
understanding of the conditions under which
local and regional organizations work in distant
places and acted as sensitive bridges between the
foundation and potential grantees. These program
officers brought extensive personal networks to
their work, and they conducted extended site
visits to maximize their current knowledge of
developments in their areas of responsibility.
Showing respect for local leaders, operating under
the radar of government agencies when necessary,
and quietly supporting change agents were all
core elements of their work as they carried out the
Moving Spotlight process.
Put in other words, we tried to avoid behaving
as if grant-seeking organizations exist to do the
bidding of foundation officers who occupy Olympian heights. If a foundation does not respect
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the knowledge and commitments of its grantees
in the first place, awarding grants to inadequate
recipients and attempting to instruct and guide
them appeared to us to be a profoundly illogical
and foolish way of operating.

Flexibility Within Structure: Balancing
Opposite Traits
A lesson of using the spotlight approach was that
the apparently antagonistic attributes of structure
and flexibility in a grantmaking program could, in
fact, be complementary. Flexibility is a condition
highly valued by people working in private foundations. Trustees, managers, and program officers
alike are often reluctant to commit themselves to
policies that would limit their ability to make substantial, sometimes sudden, shifts or deviations in
their grantmaking programs. The problem with
that practice is the substantial risk it presents of
enabling unfocused or capricious actions.
The Moving Spotlight gave us a highly structured
and disciplined style of grantmaking, but we also
sought to display agility and responsiveness to
unexpected developments. Using the spotlight
rhythm, we maintained steady and predictable
movements and focal points, but within that
structure we tried to support innovators and unorthodox actions. Across the board, the complexity and unpredictability of the many threats to
biological diversity in the places where it was richest led us to seek varied and flexible responses.
At the same time, working globally with modest
resources and a small staff led us to adhere to our
tight, disciplined structure. The pervasive tension
in that set of conditions shaped many tactical
principles. (See Table 2.)
A simple way of expressing the desirable (and
manageable) tension between structure and flexibility in a foundation’s grantmaking practice is
the image of a playground seesaw. (See Figure
2.) The constant and very useful challenge is to
stand with one foot on either side of the fulcrum,
seeking to maintain equilibrium between these
equally necessary qualities. Foundation work
is not necessarily as easy as it looks: It calls for
intense concentration and discipline to maintain
one’s balance.
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TABLE 2 Moving Spotlight Tactical Principles

Structure
(Focus)

Flexibility
(Agility)

1. Define, explain, and publish program guidelines
to provide clearly articulated screens for managing
new proposals.

1. Stay open to unexpected ideas; accept
unsolicited inquiries as well as selectively inviting
proposals in each program area.

2. Choose well-defined geographic and thematic
focal points to concentrate effort and avoid
scattering within a global program.

2. Inside specific regions and themes, find diverse
grantees and actions to maximize impact and
learning.

3. Award grants based on knowledge of frontline
conditions and leaders gained in site visits by staff;
paper alone is inadequate.

3. Respond to local conditions and leadership by
making grants for broad programs, not narrowly
defined projects.

4. Organize grants almost entirely in clusters
awarded simultaneously to focus staff energy and
present clear picture to board and public.

4. Tailor the mix of grants in each cluster to fit
diverse local priorities within range of program
goals; no single predetermined approach.

5. Seek mutual reinforcement or convergence
among grants in each cluster to elevate leverage (or
influence) of foundation grants.

5. Diversify types of grantees, types of action,
and levels of action supported by program (local,
national, and transnational).

6. Provide funds for program objectives in each
major area over relatively long term; minimize shortterm projects.

6. Limit long-term commitments to specific
grantees; adjust composition of grant clusters at
three-year intervals.

7. Limit support for traditional roles of industrial
country institutions; employ relatively restricted
program grants.

7. Emphasize actions that build resilient institutions
in developing countries; make relatively unrestricted
program grants.

8. Coordinate actions, whenever possible, with
other donors, including public sector agencies and
other private foundations.

8. Exercise the foundation’s freedom to support
what other will not; take frequent calculated risks.

9. Make payments in declining steps to reduce
grantee’s expectations and risk of excessive
dependence on one donor.

9. Allow flexibility in budgets and timing of spending
to serve grantees’ priorities and to support rapid
responses to change.

10. Commission independent evaluations of grant
clusters at three-year intervals; use their findings in
planning new clusters.

10. Foster mutual trust with grantees by using
clear, objective monitoring and evaluation; be
partners, not judges.

11. Listen, Learn and Adapt

Conclusion: So What?
The particular set of strategic and tactical choices
adopted by the MacArthur environment program is clearly not for everyone, nor should it be.
Diversity, both in strategic objectives and operating methods, is a critical strength and value of
private philanthropy that can (and should) elevate
the creativity, resilience, and contributions of its
grantees to the people they serve. Homogenization among personal donors and private foundations, however unlikely, is simply not a good idea.
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Despite passing fads and the advocates of various
“best practices,” American private philanthropy
will remain largely eccentric and uncoordinated,
and that is mostly a desirable condition. The
range of issues and problems needing remedies
will always be broad and evolving. No single set of
values or frame of mind can adequately contend
with all of them. Some donors will adopt the
language of “strategic philanthropy.” Others will
make large endowment or capital gifts that aim
for the long term and cannot be closely controlled
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FIGURE 2 Maintaining constructive tension in grantmaking tactics requires a careful balancing act.

Structure

VS

by them.8 It should be difficult to make the case,
implicit in some currently popular rhetoric, that
such capital gifts have little meaningful strategic
value.
Other donors may choose to emphasize shortterm methods, employing restricted project
grants focused on detailed schedules or “milestones” and precisely quantified “outcomes.” The
likelihood of stimulating significant lasting results
with that approach is open to serious question,
but the unpredictability of social systems makes
a diversity of donor tactics desirable. Choosing
smaller and shorter-term strategic goals that are
congruent with a donor’s motives and financial
resources can be a reasonable course of action so
long as the inherent limitations of that grantmaking style are understood.
The basic premise of the Moving Spotlight was
that our work aimed to strengthen institutions
and individual leaders who could carry on after
our grants ended, thereby making the foundation’s actions more valuable than the amount of
8
Good examples of such gifts were the matching grants
of $113 million to the University of California, Berkeley,
in 2007 to create 100 endowed professorships, and $400
million to Stanford University in 2001 for the humanities,
sciences, and undergraduate instruction, awarded by the
William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.
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dollars awarded. In one way, this approach was
the opposite of the popular advice that private
foundations should offer “more than just the
money” by giving substantive guidance to their
grantees. Yet by offering relatively flexible funds,
we followed that advice in a different way, giving
them trust and respect in addition to “just the
money.” Outstanding as they were, we did not
believe that our staff was qualified to offer managerial or programmatic direction to our grantees.
When customers sought such advice, we were
inclined to offer grant funds enabling them to hire
consultants who possessed the right expertise and
were not in the power position of our program
officers.
Recognizing the inadequacy of our financial
resources to produce durable change in the
course taken by a complex global problem, we
saw our basic challenge as struggling to stimulate
more progress than we could actually pay for. We
believed that foundation staff members are more
likely to add value to the funds they are paid to allocate when they operate with that understanding
of their work. Our principal technique for doing
that was to seek the growth and adaptability of
our grantees, gambling on their long-term influence and momentum when we could give them a
boost with our program grants.
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We viewed the basic effect of our program grants
as the maintenance or acceleration of actions
begun by others rather than the initiation of actions conceived by us. Our grants were intended
in nearly every case to be the addition of some
financial fuel to the gas tanks of vehicles that
already existed, not ones that we had built.9 This
position is the opposite of the “NIH (Not Invented Here) Syndrome” that characterizes the
corporate attitudes and operating styles of some
major donors.
The results of almost every foundation grant
depend conclusively on the ability of grantees to
attract funds from varied sources over the long
haul. We called the independent decisions of
other donors, customers, or government agencies
to support the programs and policies initiated or
advanced by our grantees the functional equivalent of profit in philanthropy. In other words, the
Foundation reaped a profit when other completely independent donors – sometime collaborators,
but always beyond our control – chose to back
the same actors or concepts that we had supported, thereby sustaining their influence.10
Results of this kind are also called leverage in
philanthropy, a very different meaning from the
business use of the word that refers to debt. Concepts and grantees that attract diverse sources
of support are on their way to long-term impact
because they are passing the tough market tests
that exist in the nonprofit world.
Thinking about the context of philanthropic
work, we viewed the remarkable freedom enjoyed
by private foundations in the United States as a
political product of the substantial contributions
9
A major exception to that principle was the establishment
by MacArthur of the World Resources Institute (WRI) in
1982, before the Moving Spotlight was devised. WRI has
clearly passed many market tests by attracting substantial
funds from other donors over the past 30 years.
10
A rare but outstanding example of profitable collaboration among foundations was the creation in 1991 of the Energy Foundation through pooled contributions by MacArthur, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Pew Charitable
Trusts. Twenty-one years later, the Energy Foundation
receives no funds from the three original donors, but has
a much larger budget resulting from the decisions of more
than a dozen other foundations to support its grantmaking
programs.
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made by their grantees to the public welfare, not
as a result of the foundations’ extraordinary wisdom. Similarly, we observed that the lasting value
of foundation actions follow from how well they
exercise that freedom and achieve leverage (or
profits), rather than from the size of their endowments and grants budgets.

The results of almost every
foundation grant depend
conclusively on the ability of
grantees to attract funds from
varied sources over the long haul.
We called the independent decisions
of other donors, customers, or
government agencies to support the
programs and policies initiated
or advanced by our grantees the
functional equivalent of profit in
philanthropy.

Although the public pays attention almost entirely
to large grants and to actions of the largest donors, we concluded that private foundations of all
sizes can generate philanthropic profits through
exercising their freedom creatively. By taking full
advantage of their independence and selectively
ignoring conventional wisdom about grantmaking, small and mid-sized foundations often accomplish more than they can directly purchase.
Their stories should be told and appreciated more
widely.
The tale of the Moving Spotlight describes a
long-term experiment aimed at gaining philanthropic profits made by one element of a large
private foundation that chose to operate with
a global perspective while also making grants
105

Martin

with national and local objectives. Our experiment is not likely to be adopted in detail by other
foundations, and this report does not imply that
it should be seen as a “best practice.” Some of our
environmental tactics were a result of our board’s
strategic decision to work in many countries.
Consequently, some of our procedures were less
relevant to the design of purely national or local
giving programs. Most of them, however, raise
questions that can usefully be considered by most
foundation managers.

Grantmaking craft, or style, or
tactics can be at least as significant
in foundation program design and
management (and probably to
grantmaking effectiveness) as are
substantive strategic choices. This
dynamic applies to any organized
philanthropy, regardless of its size.

In any case, foundation program design and
management must be understood as a craft, a
combination of art and science, of beauty and
usefulness, of subtlety and practicality (Sennett,
2008). To produce superior results, craftsmanship requires individual skill and judgment rather
than an industrial perspective or conformity to
common patterns. The concept of craft, which
entails both technique and creativity (or structure
and flexibility) is extremely relevant to any careful
consideration of foundation management and the
pursuit of philanthropic influence. Craft work is
akin to custom tailoring; it is made by hand.11 It
does not lend itself to algorithms.
The GrantCraft program, initiated by the Ford Foundation and now operated by the Foundation Center and the
European Foundation Centre, is a valuable source of ideas
about private foundation management. The Grantmaking
School, operated by Michigan’s Grand Valley State University, is a good example of new (and overdue) attention to
the professional training of foundation officers.

11
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The simple point of this story is that grantmaking
craft, or style, or tactics can be at least as significant in foundation program design and management (and probably to grantmaking effectiveness)
as are substantive strategic choices. This dynamic
applies to any organized philanthropy, regardless
of its size.
Elements of grantmaking style we have discussed
include:
1. choices about the size of a foundation’s staff
and the nature of its expertise,
2. choices about the timing and duration of most
grant awards,
3. the use of simultaneously awarded portfolios
of grants,
4. recurring external evaluation of program
decisions and design,
5.

adopting data-driven strategic priorities that
are open to challenge,

6. consistent and open explanation of decisions
about applications for grants,
7. recurring meetings among grantees to develop and share relevant knowledge,
8. building honest and trusting relationships
with customers,
9. emphasis on durable institutions and creative leaders rather than artificially defined
projects, and
10. a focus on long-term influence as opposed to
short-term control.
All of these practices deal with relatively routine
aspects of foundation management, and most of
them can be applied to grantmaking programs
regardless of their strategic objectives. While diverse, this list falls far short of covering the entire
range of procedural options. Many other tactical
techniques are available, such as matching grants,
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competitive prizes, and intermediary grantees. All Stannard-Stockton, S. (2007). The evolution of
of those methods and others not mentioned here
the tactical philanthropist. In S. Raymond and M. B.
deserve analysis and discussion among people
Martin (Eds.), Mapping the new world of American
concerned with the performance of private founphilanthropy (pp. 39-47). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
dations. They are all consequential, but no single
approach can be described as a “best practice.”
Dan M. Martin, Ph.D., is senior scholar at the Woodrow WilThe unconventional procedures used by the
MacArthur environment program were made
possible by the particular circumstances of that
foundation over more than 20 years. Those conditions will not occur the same way elsewhere, but
elements of the Moving Spotlight approach might
be considered as foundation leaders think explicitly about the processes or style they use as well as
the substance of their missions.

son International Center for Scholars. In addition to his work
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and Gordon and Betty Moore Foundations. Correspondence
concerning this article should be addressed to Dan M. Martin, Woodrow Wilson International Center, 1300 Pennsylvania
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20004-3027 (email: dan_martin1@aol.com).

Those processes are tactics or methods for carrying out any foundation’s work, and they are not
the same as grantmaking strategies. The variety of
tactical options is large, as some of the unorthodox choices described here are meant to suggest.
Although strategy and tactics need to be congruent, tactical or stylistic patterns warrant separate,
serious consideration at least as rigorous as that
sometimes given to choices about the objectives
of a foundation’s giving.
Tactical principles like these can provide internal discipline for private foundations, a class of
organizations subject to practically no external
disciplinary pressures. Because self-discipline is
nearly the only kind available to them, it deserves
close and explicit attention from foundation
trustees, managers, and staff.
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